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ABSTRACT
In 2007, the Supreme Court decided MedImmune v. Genentech. This
decision changed the landscape of the patent licensing field by holding that a
licensee in good standing may challenge the validity of a patent in a
declaratory judgment action. By adding to the cost of entering a license
agreement, MedImmune erodes one characteristic of a patent from which it
derives its worth—the patent’s ability to be licensed. Unfortunately, this has
decreased the incentive to innovate by decreasing the value of a patent. This
Comment seeks to illustrate, using a game theoretic model, how MedImmune
will increase litigation against patent licensors, which in turn will increase the
risk of entering a license agreement and decrease the value of a patent.
INTRODUCTION
In 1982, with the Federal Courts Improvement Act, Congress created the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit was created, in
part, as a response to the Supreme Court’s neglect of the patent field.1 Thus,
one can say it was designed to give life to patent law by serving as an expert,
specialized court that provides competency and unity to national patent law.
Initially, the Supreme Court’s withdrawal became even more evident after the
creation of the Federal Circuit. This caused one author to declare in 2001 that
the “Federal Circuit . . . has become the de facto supreme court of patents.”2
Things changed in 2001.3 The Supreme Court began to grant certiorari to
an exceedingly larger amount of patent cases. In the nineteen years of the
Federal Circuit’s life before 2001, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to only
eleven patent cases (an average of .58 cases per term), which addressed
substantive issues of patent law. From 2001 to 2011, almost half the time, the
Supreme Court will have decided twelve substantive patent cases (an average of
1.3 cases per term).4 These decisions have been largely considered anti1. One academic observed that “[p]atents do not bulk large in the present business of the
Supreme Court,” and the Court had “relegated the resolution of patent controversies to the lower levels
of the federal judiciary.” Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court and Patents and Monopolies xii
(1975).
2. Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
387, 387 (2001).
3. Scholars often cite the decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
535 U.S. 722 (2002) as the decision that marked the Supreme Court’s return to patent law. See, e.g.,
John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return to the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002
SUP. CT. REV. 273 (2002).
4. Id.; Three cases have been granted certiorari for next term: Microsoft Corp. v. i4i L.P., No.
10-290, 2010 WL 3392402 (U.S., Nov. 29, 2010); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v.
Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., No. 09-1159, 2010 WL 1180644 (U.S., November 01, 2010); Tech
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., No. 10-6, 2010 WL 2629783 (U.S., Oct. 12, 2010). Notably, this will tie
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patentee.5 Therefore, one could say that if the Federal Circuit gives life to the
patentee, the Supreme Court is where the patentee goes to die.
Part of this trend was the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc.,6 which, in an eight-to-one decision, made it easier for patent
licensees to challenge the validity of a patent it is licensing.7 The Court held
that a licensee does not have to break the license agreement and risk being
assessed breach of contract damages before filing a declaratory judgment
action.8 It reasoned that an Article III controversy exists, with regards to a
declaratory judgment action, when “the facts alleged, under all the
circumstances, show there is a substantial controversy between the parties
having adverse legal interest, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant
the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”9 Previously, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit had articulated a more stringent standard for
declaratory judgment actions involving patent claims: whether there was a
reasonable apprehension of suit (RAS).10 Under the RAS test, there must be
(1) action(s) by the patent holder, which gives rise to a reasonable
apprehension of an infringement suit against the declaratory judgment
plaintiffs; and (2) action(s) by the declaratory judgment plaintiff that could
constitute infringement. In sum, the Supreme Court stomped out the RAS
doctrine in favor of a lesser standard.
The purpose of this Comment will be to examine the effects of
MedImmune on both the patentee and licensee by deploying a game theoretic
model. By doing so, this Comment seeks to shed light on when and how
MedImmune affects the relationship of a licensee and a patentee by analyzing
the landscape of the parties’ respective strategic concerns.

2007 as the term with the most patent law cases decided since the creation of the Federal Circuit.
5. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (raised the standard of
inventiveness); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (limited a patentee’s ability to
see injunctive relief); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (limited the geographic
reach of infringement liability); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc. 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008)
(expanded scope of exhaustion doctrine); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193
(2005) (expanded experimental use defense); MedImmune v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118 (2007)
(lowering the standard for declaratory judgment standing).
6. MedImmune v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
7. Id. at 137.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 127 (quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273
(1941)).
10. See, e.g., Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Cordis Corp. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 780 F.2d 991 (Fed. Cir. 1985); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 879–80
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
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I. BACKGROUND
This Section will examine the necessary background case law to identify
the strategic concerns that now affect both patentees and licensees. First, the
Federal Circuit’s Reasonable Apprehension standard will be cursorily
discussed. Second, the Supreme Court’s dismantling of this standard in
MedImmune v. Genentech will be examined. Finally, the Federal Circuit’s
response to MedImmune will be analyzed.
A. The Federal Circuit’s Reasonable Apprehension Standard
The Declaratory Judgment Act does not create federal jurisdiction.11
Subject matter jurisdiction must exist first because of a federal question or
diversity.12 In addition to having subject matter jurisdiction, the courts have
required an actual controversy to exist between the parties.13
In a declaratory judgment action the plaintiff has the burden of proof in
establishing that an actual controversy exists as a matter of law.14 For patents,
the plaintiff must meet a two-part standard by showing “(1) an explicit threat
or other action by the patentee, which creates a reasonable apprehension on
the part of the declaratory plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and
(2) present activity which could constitute infringement or concrete steps
taken with the intent to conduct such activity.”15 The first prong looks to the
conduct of the plaintiff, the alleged infringer; while the second prong looks at
the conduct of the defendant, the patentee.16

11.

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).
The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to “cases of actual
controversy,” manifestly has regard to the constitutional provision and is
operative only in respect to controversies which are such in the constitutional
sense. The word “actual” is one of emphasis rather than of definition. Thus the
operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only. In providing
remedies and defining procedure in relation to cases and controversies in the
constitutional sense the Congress is acting within its delegated power over the
jurisdiction of the federal courts which the Congress is authorized to establish.

Id.
12. Id.
13. Interpretive case law of the Declaratory Judgment Act is seemingly wary of giving the
Act independent procedural teeth because of the courts’ reluctance to give advisory opinions.
Michael Weinstein, The Fate of the Federal Circuit’s “Reasonable Apprehension” Standard in
Patent Suits For Declaratory Judgment Following MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S.Ct.
764 (2007), 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 681, 683 (2008).
14. Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
15. BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
16. Id.
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The first prong is a safeguard against courts making advisory opinions.17
It analyzes whether the plaintiff is either engaged in conduct that may amount
to infringement or is taking meaningful and preparatory steps to what will
likely constitute infringing actions.18 To satisfy this standard, courts look to
how imminent the infringing actions are,19 and whether this infringing
conduct is sufficiently definite to constitute infringement.20
The second prong inquires whether the plaintiff, the accused infringer,
reasonably believes the patentee will initiate suit.21 This is an objective
standard; the subjective belief of the plaintiff is insufficient.22
Courts have relied on several factors when evaluating whether a plaintiff
is in reasonable apprehension of a suit: the patentee’s litigation history,23 the

17. See Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Wembley, Inc. v. Superba Cravats, Inc., 315 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1963).
18. Int’l Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co., 623 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1980).
19. Sierra Applied Scis., Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., 363 F.3d 1361, 1378 (2004).
20. See Id. “This approach is proper: The greater the variability of the subject of a
declaratory-judgment suit, particularly as to its potentially infringing features, the greater the chance
that the court's judgment will be purely advisory, detached from the eventual, actual content of that
subject—in short, detached from eventual reality.” Id.
Our concern is not that the [product at issue] will never be produced, but rather
that because of the relatively early stage of its development, the design which is
before us now may not be the design which is ultimately produced and
marketed. For a decision in a case such as this to be anything other than an
advisory opinion, the plaintiff must establish that the product presented to the
court is the same product which will be produced if a declaration of
noninfringement is obtained.
Int'l Harvester Co., 623 F.2d at 1216; accord Infinitech, Inc. v. Vitrophage, Inc., 847 F. Supp, 332,
336 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
21. Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
The purpose of the declaratory action is to permit a threatened party to resolve
its potential liability, but only when the relationship has progressed to an actual
controversy, as required by Article III of the Constitution. Although access to
declaratory procedures in patent cases does not necessarily require an explicit
threat of suit, to create an actual controversy there must be more than ongoing
license negotiations. There must be action by the patent holder sufficient to
create an objectively reasonable apprehension that suit will be brought against
the declaratory plaintiff.
Id.
22. “The ‘reasonable apprehension of suit’ test requires more than the nervous state of mind
of a possible infringer; it requires that the objective circumstances support such an apprehension” Id.
at 1053–54; accord Indium Corp. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 883 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
23. Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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relationship between the parties,24 and the contact and negotiations between
parties with regards to the patent at issue.25 If express threats of suit are
present, this is obviously a truncated analysis; however, absent explicit threats
the court will evaluate the “totality of the circumstances” when deciding if the
plaintiff was in reasonable apprehension of a suit.26
B. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. was a battle among biotechnology
titans. Genentech was one of the pioneers in the field and focused its
development on upstream genetic information.27 MedImmune, the licensee,
was the developer of medicines used to treat a variety of diseases.28
In 1997, the parties entered into license agreements involving two sets of
advances by Genentech.29 One agreement was for an advancement that was
covered by a patent that had issued prior to the license; the other was the
subject of a pending patent application.30 When a patent issued on the
pending application, Genentech sent MedImmune a letter claiming that the
new patent covered Synagis, a drug that accounted for 80% of MedImmune’s
revenue.31
MedImmune was in a tough position. To MedImmune, the letter was
clearly a threat to terminate the license and sue for infringement unless a more
beneficial agreement to Genentech could be reached. MedImmune, however,
believed the patent was invalid and unenforceable, and thus, not infringed.32
As a result, MedImmune was faced with either maintaining the status quo,

24. Studex Corp. v. Blomdahl Medical Innovation AB, 355 F. Supp. 2d 3, 8 (D.D.C. 2004).
25. EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
26. Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631, 634 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 272 (1941)).
27. Although primarily engaged in the same business, Genentech is now a subsidiary of
Roche, Inc. Being founded on the heels of the discovery of recombinant DNA technology,
Genentech is considered the “founder of the biotechnology industry.” Before being acquired by
Roche, Inc., Genentech’s stock symbol was “DNA.” See Genentech “About Us” Page,
http://www.gene.com/gene/about (last visited Feb. 22, 2011); Genentech “History” Page,
http://www.gene.com/gene/about/corporate/history (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
28. Today, MedImmune is an LLC, and a wholly owned subsidiary of AstraZeneca.
MedImmune “About Us” Page, http://www.medimmuneMedImmune.com/about_us.aspx (last
visited Feb. 22, 2011). MedImmune, LLC has been the recipient of several governmental contracts
for the manufacture of the novel H1N1 FluMist. Vandana Sinha, MedImmune Gets Second H1N1
BUSINESS
JOURNAL,
Jul.
13,
2009,
Flu
Contract,
WASHINGTON
http://washington.bizjournals.com/washington/stories/2009/07/13/daily21.html.
29. MedImmune v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118, 121 (2007).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 121–22.
32. Id.
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which would result in Genentech terminating the license and suing for
infringement thereby exposing MedImmune to treble damages, attorney’s
fees, and the loss of most of its business, or challenging the patent through a
declaratory judgment action.33 At the time, the latter required MedImmune to
break the license agreement themselves and suffer breach of contract
damages; otherwise, an Article III case or controversy would not be present.34
Attempting to pave new ground, MedImmune chose a third option—
paying the license fees and bringing a declaratory judgment action to
determine the rights and legal relations of the parties.35 This failed in the
lower courts when, sticking to the Gen-Probe holding, dismissed the suit. The
Federal Circuit affirmed.36 It was concluded that MedImmune was a licensee
in good standing, and accordingly, was not in reasonable apprehension of suit
(RAS).37 Thus, the matter was not justiciable.38

33. Since this Comment will use a game theoretic framework to analyze strategic concerns, it
is of probative value to outline, in detail, exactly what MedImmune’s options (and risks associated
with these options) were: (1) Do nothing—this would in all likelihood cause Genentech to terminate
the license and sue for infringement, which would subject MedImmune to treble damages, attorney’s
fees, and the loss of its primary source of business but would also subject Genentech’s patent to
judicial scrutiny because MedImmune would surely claim it was invalid as a defense; (2)
preemptively terminate the license and stop manufacturing Synagis—MedImmune had the right,
under the license agreement, to terminate the agreement with six months notice, while avoiding
treble damages and attorney’s fees, MedImmune would still lose its primary source of business; (3)
challenge the validity of the patent through a declaratory judgment action—at the time, this would
cause MedImmune to suffer breach of contract damages and force it to go through costly patent
litigation. See Id. In option (1), MedImmune is risking the most; however, they may also gain the
most by obtaining a judgment that the Genentech patent is invalid. In option two, MedImmune is
risking very little as the way of damages; however, is conceding it primary source of business.
MedImmune also has nothing to gain besides cutting their losses in option (2). In option (3),
MedImmune can gain the reward in option (1) but is risking less—only breach of contract damages
and the cost of litigation as opposed to treble damages, MedImmune’s attorney’s fees, and litigation
costs. (This will be graphically represented later in the Comment.)
34. U.S. CONST. art. III; Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006); see, e.g.,
Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or
not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
Id.
36. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, No. CV 03-2567, 2004 WL 3770589 (C.D. Cal.);
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
37. MedImmune, 427 F.3d at 964.
38. Id.

SMITH_COMMENT (8).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

510

MARQUETTE I.P. LAW REVIEW

6/20/2011 3:29:04 PM

[Vol. 15:2

Upon review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.39 Justice Scalia, speaking
for the majority, rejected the Federal Circuit’s RAS test.40 The Court
reasoned that the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act was to prevent the
plaintiff from having to “bet the farm.”41 In other words, the mere fact that
MedImmune was faced with a choice—risk the business or abandon the rights
under the license—was sufficient to create Article III jurisdiction.42
Overturning the second prong to the reasonable apprehension of suit test
changes the field patent litigants play on drastically. Now, the standard is
whether there is a “substantial controversy.”43 When determining whether
asubstantial controversy exists, a court should be guided by all the
circumstances.44 This seems analogous to the previous “totality of the
circumstances” analysis.45
The effects of this new, lowered standard are still somewhat unknown.
The Federal Circuit is still getting its legs underneath it. However, there have
been decisions since MedImmune, which do shed light on how the Federal
Circuit will interpret the new standard. The next section of this Comment will
briefly discuss these developments. This will allow for a more accurate
framing of the strategic concerns to assist in the analysis.
C. Federal Circuit’s Response to MedImmune
Since the Supreme Court’s dismantling of the RAS test in MedImmune,
the Federal Circuit has decided several cases interpreting MedImmune. Most
notably, the Federal Circuit’s decision in SanDisk Corp. v.
STMicroelectronics, Inc.46 and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis
39. MedImmune v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007).
40. See id. at 132 n.11. The Court concluded that the “RAS” test could not be reconciled
with its decision in Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943), which it concluded was still good law
despite being distinguished by Gen-Probe. Id.
41. Id. at 129.
42. Id. Seemingly, this would be no choice at all for MedImmune since the patent in
question would have covered a drug that accounted for eighty percent of MedImmune’s business.
One could argue that this fact was a driving factor for the Court’s analysis. In other words, since
MedImmune did not have any choice but a lawsuit of some flavor, they were in what would be an
equivalent state to “reasonable apprehension of suit.” See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 13, at 698.
In MedImmune, the Court was presented with a particularly egregious fact situation; had
MedImmune breached the license agreement to challenge the patent, it may have been enjoined from
producing a product that represented more than 80% of its revenue and sales. The Court noted that a
party should not have to ‘bet the farm’ before seeking declaratory judgment.
Id. (citation omitted)
43. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 138.
44. Id.
45. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 272 (1941).
46. SanDisk Corp v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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Pharmaceutical Corp.47 are illustrative of the Federal Circuit’s response.
1. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.
SanDisk is a manufacturer of flash memory storage, and ST was a
newcomer to the flash memory market.48 As a result, ST approached SanDisk
in attempt to secure a cross-licensing agreement.49 During negotiations, both
ST and SanDisk provided each other with an infringement analysis of their
respective patents sought to be licensed; however, each party maintained that
they had no intention to file suit. Despite these assurances, SanDisk filed suit
claiming that ST was infringing its patents.50 Incident to this, SanDisk sought
declaratory judgment declaring the invalidity and non-infringement of the ST
patents.51 The district court dismissed upon ST’s motion for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because it concluded that SanDisk was not in reasonable
apprehension of suit.52
Upon review and in light of MedImmune, the Federal Circuit vacated the
district court’s dismissal. The court concluded that it has subject matter
jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment action when the plaintiff disputes a
defendant’s claim of right, and failure to recognize this claim would cause the
plaintiff to risk treble damages.53 The court reasoned that an explicit threat of
litigation is not a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction in a declaratory
judgment action.54 The mere fact that ST committed acts that demonstrated
its belief that SanDisk was infringing on ST’s patents was sufficient for

47. Teva. Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d. 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
48. SanDisk Corp., 480 F.3d at 1374.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1375–76.
51. Id.
52. SanDisk Corp v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-04379 JF, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS
44870, *16 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
53. SanDisk Corp., 480 F.3d at 1374.
As the Supreme Court noted, “the declaratory judgment procedure is an
alternative to pursuit of the arguably illegal activity.” The Supreme Court
clarified that, although a declaratory judgment plaintiff may eliminate an
“imminent threat of harm by simply not doing what he claimed the right to do[,]
. . . [t]hat did not preclude subject-matter jurisdiction [where] the threateliminating behavior was effectively coerced.” “The dilemma posed by that
coercion-putting the challenger to the choice between abandoning his rights or
risking prosecution-is a dilemma that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory
Judgment Act to ameliorate.”
Id. (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech., 127 S. Ct. 764, 773 (2007)) (internal citations omitted).
54. Id. at 1381.
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jurisdiction.55
2. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp.
A New Drug Application for Famvir®, a herpes treatment drug, was held
by Novartis.56 Novartis listed one patent related to the ingredient composition
and four patents covering the methods of therapeutic use in the Orange
Book.57 Notably, the composition patent was set to expire approximately five
years before the patents covering the methods.58 Teva, in an attempt to create
a generic version of Famvir®, submitted an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) certifying
that its generic version did not infringe on any of the patents held by Novartis,
or in the alternative, the patents were invalid.59
In response to Teva’s ANDA, Novartis sued Teva for infringement of the
composition patent.60 Teva brought a separate declaratory judgment action
seeking the court to declare the method patents invalid.61 Applying the RAS
test, the district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
declaratory judgment action.62
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the Federal Circuit
reversed.63 It reasoned that by listing all five patents in the Orange Book,
Novartis claimed the right to file a patent infringement suit against any
potential infringer.64 This, coupled with Teva’s certification of non55. Id. at 1381–82. (holding only that where a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on
certain identified ongoing or planned activity of another party, and where that party contends that it
has the right to engage in the accused activity without license, an Article III case or controversy will
arise and the party need not risk a suit for infringement by engaging in the identified activity before
seeking a declaration of its legal rights.). It is of note that Judge Bryson, in a concurring opinion,
agreed that the court reached the right decision in light of MedImmune; however, Judge Bryson
voiced his concerns that the license negotiations in SanDisk were run-of-the-mill and that
MedImmune’s broadening allows for a declaratory judgment action in “virtually any case in which
the recipient of an invitation to take a patent license elects to dispute the need for a license and then
to sue the patentee.” Id. at 1385 (Bryson, J., concurring).
56. Teva. Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d. 1330, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1334–35.
61. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 05-2881 JLL, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38649 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2005).
62. Id. at *2–3.
63. Teva, 482 F.3d. at 1340.
64. Id. at 1341–42. The majority looked at the totality of the circumstance; however, it is
unknown whether the mere listing of the patents in the Orange Book would alone to give rise to
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Judge Friedman, in a concurring opinion, concluded that listing in the
Orange Book would be sufficient as long as Teva certified that it was not infringing on any patents in
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infringement and invalidity, gave Novartis the right to sue.65 The court stated
“[i]t logically follows that if [submitting an ANDA] creates a justiciable
controversy for one party, the same action should create a justiciable
declaratory judgment controversy for the opposing party.”66
II. MODEL
A. Introduction
One of the most powerful uses of game theory is its use of comparing
legal regimes.67 This is precisely what this Comment aims to do: compare the
pre-MedImmune and post-MedImmune regimes. Specifically, this Comment
will create a model to analyze the strategic behavior of the patentee and a
licensee in a patent license situation. To complete this analysis, three steps
will have to be undertaken: (1) identify the players in the game; (2) identify
and analyze the strategies available to each player; and (3) create payoffs for
all the combinations of various strategies.68 After identifying these aspects of
the model, a normal-form game will be constructed. This game is appropriate
when two players are interacting and must decide their respective strategies
without knowing what the other player’s strategy is going to be.69 However,
before this is done, it is of use to go over the assumptions of a game theoretic
model. Doing so will hopefully address inevitable criticisms of the model,
without necessarily satisfying the critics.
B. Assumptions
Game theory finds its foundational roots in classical economics and
rational choice theory; accordingly, the assumptions of rational choice and
classical economics attach.70 Many authors are critical of game theory
because of these very assumptions.71
Rationality brings to the table with it two assumptions.72 A decision
its ANDA. Id. at 1346–47 (Friedman, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 1341–43.
66. Id. at 1342.
67. See, e.g., Daniel Orr, The Superiority of Comparative Negligence: Another Vote, 20 J.
LEGAL STUD. 119 (1991).
68. This procedural break down of game theory is presented in DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL.,
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 8 (1994).
69. The game utilized in this Comment is commonly referred to as the prisoner’s dilemma,
and was first discovered in 1950 by RAND scientists. WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S
DILEMMA 8 (1992).
70. See Baird et. al, supra note 68, at 46.
71. Id. at 47.
72. See generally JOHN VON NEUMANN AND OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES
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maker, or player, in a game-theoretic model is said to be rational because each
player is assumed to be in pursuit of increasing his or her utility and each
player is assumed to have stable preferences.73
First, utility is maximized in a game-theoretic model by maximizing one’s
payoffs. For the purposes of this Comment, maximizing the payoff is
equivalent to maximizing monetary payoff. This is not always the case,
however. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that a dollar translates into
an equal amount of payoff for each company player in this Comment.74
Second, each player is assumed to have consistent preferences that is the
rank ordering of the payoffs for a given strategies.75 If player A prefers x to y
and y to z, it follows that player A must prefer x to z.76
C. The Players
There are two main players in the model presented in this Comment: the
patentee, who is often the declaratory judgment defendant in cases where the
validity or enforceability of a patent is being tested, and the licensee, who is
the declaratory judgment plaintiff challenging the validity or enforceability of
the patentee’s patent.77 In sum, the parties to a declaratory judgment suit are
reversed from that of a conventional suit.78

AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR

(1947).
73. ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 3–4 (1997). In real life
situations, the assumption of rationality will not always be satisfied. Nevertheless, this assumption is
central to game theory. As Myerson said:
we should be suspicious of theories and predications that are not consistent with
this assumption.
If a theory predicts that some individuals will be
systematically fooled or led into making costly mistakes, than this theory will
tend to lose its validity when the individuals learn . . . to better understand the
situation.

Id. at 5.
74. Maximizing utility does not always equate to maximizing monetary payoffs because it is
difficult to measure utility in currency. For example, an individual may get more value from an
increased monetary payoff when he or she is poor than if he or she is rich. Accordingly, for
individuals, measuring utility as a function of monetary payoff may be non-linear or heteroskedastic.
This is less true of corporations, who seek to maximize payoff of shareholders. See generally John
W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large, 32 ECONOMETRICA 122 (1964).
75. JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES 15 (1982).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); SanDisk Corp v.
STMicroelectronics, Inc, 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Teva. Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis
Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d. 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc. 359 F.3d 1376, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
78. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
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In the game-theoretic model presented, it will be assumed that the
patentee and the licensee are already parties to a license agreement. There are
many strategies that a patentee or a licensee may undertake when negotiating
a license.79 These strategies would needlessly complicate this model, and
accordingly, are not addressed.
D. Strategies and Pay-Offs
The strategies and the associated payoffs for each strategy are central to
any normal form game.80 Here, each player will have two different strategies
available to them: “Do Nothing” and “Challenge.” While the strategies will
be named the same for each player, the Challenge strategy for each player is
very different. The following subsections discuss the strategies in more detail
and explain their payoffs for both the pre-MedImmune and post-MedImmune
legal regimes.
Before examining any strategy in depth, it is important to layout some
background information of the game. As discussed earlier, the patentee and
the licensee already have a license. Since this model is examining monetary
gains and losses, any value realized by the patentee or licensee outside the
license agreement is ignored. In other words, the cost of the license to the
licensee and the revenue this generates for the patentee are constant terms; the
actual value of the license to each party is irrelevant. Accordingly, the cost of
the license or its gains, respectively are the starting point for each party’s
payoff. Every payoff is a function of these constants. It will be assumed that
the remainder of the license will cost the licensee one hundred (100) units,
and accordingly, the patentee will gain one hundred (100) units for the
remainder of the license.81
79. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives
to Innovate After MedImmune, 24 BERKLEY TECH L.J. 971, 991–1005 (2009) (discussing
approaches to licensing in light of MedImmune).
80. Baird et al., supra note 68, at 8.
81. One hundred (100) was arbitrarily selected. However, any number can be used because
the rest of the payoffs are a function of this number. While the results may differ with a different
number, the model can be replicated with any number. This model will introduce variance in the
form of the probability of patent validity and enforceability, not the terms of the license agreement.
Again, this would be incident to the negotiation of the license not the status quo of a given license
agreement and is outside the scope of this Comment. It is likely that one of the criticisms of this
piece or any other piece using game theory is that it assumes too much. True, the numbers are
somewhat arbitrary; however, it must not be forgotten that this model is an abstraction of reality and
it is not without its limitations:
A model is a simplification of, and approximation to, some aspect of the word.
Models are never literally “true” or “false,” although good models abstract only
the “right” feature of reality they represent . . . . Any meaningful rules admit of
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Finally, reexamination is not an available option. This Comment seeks to
illustrate the costs associated with the potential of increased litigation as a
result of MedImmune. Thus, it is assumed that reexamination is not available
or is not a prudent strategic avenue to take by the patentee or the licensee.82
1. Patentee
a. Do Nothing
The Do Nothing (DN) strategy is the simplest strategy available to the
patentee. This occurs when the patentee, in a license agreement, elects to
maintain the status quo. If the validity or enforceability of the patent goes
unchallenged, the patentee collects its royalties for the license, and eventually
the license expires. As a result, the payoff for both the pre-MedImmune and
post-MedImmune legal regime is positive one hundred (+100) if the licensee
does not Challenge:
Patentee (DN, DN) = 100.
This payoff gets more complicated if the licensee decides to Challenge
through the Declaratory Judgment Act. First, the patentee will have to pay
money to defend the validity or enforceability of a patent. In this model, the
cost to defend a declaratory judgment suit will be half the remaining value of
the license, or negative fifty units (-50).83 This is added to the gains or losses
that are potentially derived from a declaratory judgment suit initiated by the
licensee. Pre-MedImmune, the licensee would have to break the license
agreement and risk breach of contract damages. Post-MedImmune this is not
the case; the licensee can Challenge in a declaratory judgment action without
risking breach of contract damages. Here, the patentee will not be seeking
exceptions, but we can ask that exceptions be justified explicitly, that their
implications for the reliability of research be assessed, and that the uncertainty
of conclusions be reported. We seek not dogma, but disciplined thought.
GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY 47 (1994).
82. It can be said, however, that litigants are increasingly using ex parte and inter partes
reexamination as an avenue to challenge patent validity. In 2007, the USPTO experienced a record
number of reexamination requests. Reexamination, however, is often used in conjunction with
litigation. For example, reexamination can be used to stay the litigation or overturn the litigation
results. Paul Morgan & Bruce Stoner, Reexamination vs. Litigation—Making Intelligent Decisions in
Challenging Patent Validity, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 441 (2004). Thus, depending on
a given case, reexamination may be an additional cost that a patentee or licensee may strategically
decide to take on. In any regard, this cumbersome topic will not be discussed in this Comment.
83. Negative fifty (-50) again seems arbitrary, however, it allows for consistent testing of
both the licensee’s and patentee’s strategies. Since it is assumed that the licensee is rational, the
licensee would not initiate a declaratory judgment suit that would cost it more than the remaining
cost of the license. The costs are assumed to be the same for each party in the suit. This, again, is
for the sake of simplicity.
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infringement damages because this is the DN strategy.84 As a result, the
payoff for the patentee pre-MedImmune would be:
Patentee (DN, Challenge)85 = -50 + ((1- Ө)*100 – (Ө * 100)).86
Post-MedImmune would render a different payoff because the patentee
would no longer be able to realize gains in utility as a result of breach of
contract damages:
Patentee (DN, Challenge) = -50 – ((1- Ө) * 100).87
b. Challenge
When the patentee Challenges and the licensee Does Nothing, the
patentee is seeking to “lock-in” the validity and enforceability of the license.
This may be done through a consent decree.88 In a consent decree the players,
who have reached a license agreement, would subject themselves to a patent
infringement or declaratory judgment suit.89 Subsequent to initiating the suit,
the players would settle and the license agreement would become part of a
consent decree terminating the suit.90 This would prevent the validity of the
underlying patent from being Challenged because of res judicata.91
The resulting payoff for the patentee would be a function of the cost of
litigation, which would be reduced because of the cooperative nature, and the
financial gains that can be realized by eliminating the need to set aside capital
84. See the “Challenge” strategy infra Part II(D)(1)(b).
85. The patentee’s payoff is a function of the patentee’s strategy and the licensee’s strategy.
Thus: Patentee (Patentee’s strategy, Licensee’s strategy).
86. By convention, Ө is the probability that the patent will be declared invalid. Since this is a
percentage, it is multiplied by one hundred, the cost of the patent, to produce a utility amount. 1-Ө is
the probability the patent will be declared valid. Again, this is multiplied by one hundred (100) to
receive a utility amount. For example, if the probability the patent is going to be declared invalid is
0.00 than the formula would resolve to:
Patentee (DN, Challenge) = -50 + ((1-0.0)*100) – 0.0 * 100).
Patentee (DN, Challenge) = 50
In other words, the patentee would be guaranteed get the benefit of the bargain (100) minus any costs
in litigation.
87. It is assumed, as it is in all these payoffs, that the license ceases to exist after litigation.
This may not always be the case; the declaratory judgment plaintiff may choose to continue to pay
royalties and use the patented technology; however, this is outside the scope of this Comment.
88. Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 79, at 13
89. Id. It does not matter who initiates the suit. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see also Am. Equip. Corp. v. Wikomi Mfg., 630 F.2d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1980). It is
not known for sure if court will uphold these “sweetheart deals.” Id. However, courts have upheld
them in the past, even in the face of Hatch Waxman antitrust challenges. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2006); Schering–Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056,
1075 (11th Cir. 2005); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir.
2003).
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to potentially defend against a declaratory judgment suit:
Patentee (Challenge, DN) = (100 – 25) + 35
Patentee (Challenge, DN) = 110.92
These payoffs would be the same in both the pre-MedImmune and postMedImmune regimes.
If both the licensee and the patentee elect the Challenge strategy, the
payoff for the patentee would potentially increase over the Challenge strategy
when the licensee elects to Do Nothing. This would be the case when there is
both an infringement suit initiated by the patentee and a declaratory judgment
action initiated by the licensee. The total cost of litigation would not be
double the cost of litigating the declaratory judgment action alone because it
is likely that many aspects of the litigation would be duplicative.93 However,
pre-MedImmune, a win by the patentee would subject the licensee to treble
damages for willful infringement:94
Patentee (Challenge, Challenge) = -65 + ((1- Ө)*100 - Ө * 100)*3.95
Post-MedImmune, the payoff for the patentee would be the same
notwithstanding the treble damages:
Patentee (Challenge, Challenge) = -65 + ((1- Ө)*100 - Ө * 100).
2. Licensee
Now that the payoffs for the patentee have been discussed in their
92. This payoff merely demonstrates that the benefit to a patentee would have to outweigh
cost of litigation for the strategy to be a legitimate and rational choice. Intrinsic rationality, that is
rationality within a given strategy, is assumed. Again, one hundred (100) is the amount of utility left
remaining on the license agreement, twenty-five (25) is the reduced cost of the cooperative litigation,
and thirty-five (35) is the utility benefit that is realized from elimination of the threat of suit.
93. Throughout this analysis I give great weight to the cost of litigation. This, however, is
not without cause. An American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) survey stated the
median litigation costs from the commencement of the suit to the conclusion of discovery as $1.25
million, and “[]inclusive all costs” as $2.5 million. See AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 25 (2007). For suits with less than a million at
stake, the median litigation costs were $600,000. Id. For suits with more than $25 million at stake,
median costs were $5 million. Id. Thus, it is not unusual for litigation costs to be between one-fifth
and three-fifths of the value of the patent. This does not take into account the value of the perception
that a given company is willing and able to enforce their patents.
94. “The rule that a plaintiff must destroy a large building, bet the farm, or (as here) risk
treble damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business, before seeking a declaration of its actively
contested legal rights finds no support in Article III.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S.
118, 134 (2007); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
95. The negative sixty-five (-65) represents the increased (but not doubled) cost of litigation
of two suit, infringement and declaratory judgment. The rest of the formula is the same as the payoff
for Patentee (Do Nothing, Challenge) except the inclusion of three (3), which is a multiplier for triple
damages. The damages, which would be tripled, are “a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 284. The license agreement value represents this reasonable royalty.
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entirety, this Comment can now turn to the payoffs for the licensee. Since the
licensee is in a license agreement and paying royalties on this agreement, the
payoff is representative of what the licensee can save in the event of a
successful Challenge to the validity of the patent. Again, there likely are
gains in utility outside this; however, it is outside the scope of this Comment.
a. Do Nothing
If both the licensee and patentee maintain the status quo and Do Nothing,
the licensee will have a payoff of negative one hundred (-100) in both the preMedImmune and post-MedImmune regime:
Licensee (DN, DN) = -100.
If the licensee were to Do Nothing, while the patentee Challenged, this
would be equivalent to the consent decree discussed in the previous section.
Accordingly, the licensee would have additional losses because of litigation
costs; however, not spending money in preparation for future litigation would
save the licensee some money:
Licensee (DN, Challenge) = (-100 – 25) + 35
Licensee (DN, Challenge) = -90.
b. Challenge
When a licensee Challenges the validity or enforceability of the patent, he
or she seeks to gain the right to use the technology without paying royalties.
Consequently, pre-MedImmune, the payoff for choosing the Challenge
strategy can be represented as the cost of litigation plus the probability the
license is invalid multiplied by the remaining value of the license agreement:
Licensee (Challenge, DN) = -50 + (Ө * 100 - (1- Ө)*100).96
Post-MedImmune, the licensee would not have to risk breach of contract
damages:
Licensee (Challenge, DN) = -50 + (Ө * 100).
In a pre-MedImmune regime, a similar payoff, with the inclusion of
increased litigation costs and the possibility of treble damages, would occur if
both the patentee and the licensee chose the Challenge strategy:

96. Notwithstanding the litigation costs, this is the inverse of the (Challenge, DN) function of
the patentee. For example, if the probability the patent is invalid is 1.0 (100%):
Licensee (Challenge, DN) = -50 + (1.0 * 100 - (1-1.0)*100)
Licensee (Challenge, DN) = -50
In other words, the patentee would be guaranteed the benefit of the bargain (100) minus any costs of
litigation.
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Licensee (Challenge, Challenge) = -65 + (Ө * 100 – (((1- Ө)*100) *3)).
Again, post-MedImmune the licensee would not be subject to treble
damages:
Licensee (Challenge, Challenge) = -65 + (Ө * 100 – (1- Ө)*100).
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E. Bi-Matrix
Now that the payoffs are determined, they can be represented in a bimatrix for more efficient analysis as shown below in Figures 1 and 2.97

97. By convention the first number in a set is the payoff for the licensee and the second
number in the set is the payoff for the patentee.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Probability of Invalidity is Zero Percent

Under both pre-MedImmune and post-MedImmune regimes,98 when the
probability of invalidity is zero, the dominant strategy for the licensee is to Do
Nothing, while the dominant strategy for the patentee would be to Challenge
as displayed in Figures 3 and 4. In other words, when there is no question
about the validity of the patent, it makes sense to take this off the table and
enter into a consent decree. More practically, and not illustrated by this
model, both parties would likely fulfill their end of the license bargain.

98. According to the model, challenging would be the licensee’s best strategy if the patentee
were to “Do Nothing,” and the patentee’s best strategy would be “Do Nothing” if the licensee
decided to also “Do Nothing” (as there is a payoff of 110). However, it is unlikely in reality that a
licensee would challenge a license if he or she knew there was no chance of winning because the
relationship between the licensee and patentee would be damaged for only a small potential gain.
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B. Probability of Invalidity is Ten Percent

Under the pre-MedImmune regime, when the probability of invalidity is
ten, the dominant strategy for the licensee is to Do Nothing, while the
dominant strategy for the patentee would be to Challenge as depicted in
Figures 5. In other words, when there is little or no question about the
validity of the patent, it makes sense to take the possibility of litigation off the
table and enter into a consent decree.
Contrastingly, under the post-MedImmune regime, choosing the Challenge
strategy becomes more appealing to the licensee as depicted in Figure 6. For
example, if the patentee is adverse to litigation and not likely to seek an
infringement suit, the licensee’s payoff would be maximized at negative forty.
However, it is still likely that the two parties will enter into a consent decree.

SMITH_COMMENT (8).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

524

MARQUETTE I.P. LAW REVIEW

6/20/2011 3:29:04 PM

[Vol. 15:2

C. Probability of Invalidity is Fifty Percent

Under the pre-MedImmune regime, when the probability of invalidity is
fifty, it would still be prudent for both parties to enter a consent decree as
depicted in Figure 7. This is because the Do Nothing strategy of the patentee
is dominated. In other words, no matter what strategy the licensee chooses,
the patentee would maximize its payoff if it chooses to Challenge.
Accordingly, the licensee can predict the patentee would choose to Challenge,
and accordingly, will choose the strategy of Do Nothing to maximize its
payoff.
It is a different story under the post-MedImmune regime depicted in
Figure 8. Here, the dominant strategy for the licensee is to Challenge.
Regardless of what strategy the patentee chooses, the licensee’s payoff is
maximized by choosing to Challenge. As a result, the patentee will maximize
its payoff by choosing to Do Nothing.
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D. Probability of Invalidity is Seventy-five Percent

When the probability of invalidity is seventy-five, it would be best for
both players to choose the Challenge strategy under the pre-MedImmune
regime as depicted in Figure 9. Regardless of the strategy the patentee
chooses, the licensee would be wise to choose the Challenge strategy because
the payoffs are always greater than the corresponding Do Nothing payoffs.
For that reason, the patentee can predict with certainty that the licensee will
Challenge and that it should also Challenge.
Under the post-MedImmune regime depicted in Figure 10, the licensee’s
dominant strategy is to Challenge. Again, this guarantees maximization of its
payoff. Therefore, the patentee should Do Nothing, or in other words, save
litigation costs.
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E. Probability of Invalidity is One-hundred Percent

Under both the pre-MedImmune and post-MedImmune regimes depicted
in Figures 11 and 12, when it is certain the patent is invalid, it is prudent for
the licensee to Challenge the patent. Hence, the best option for the patentee
would be to minimize costs by choosing the Do Nothing strategy.
F. Summary of the Model
The difference between the pre- and post-MedImmune regimes is
illustrated at the fifty percent invalidity level. In the pre-MedImmune regime
the patentee is theoretically safe from a declaratory judgment action. The
post-MedImmune regime is different, however. MedImmune made it rational
for a licensee to haul the patentee to court for a declaratory judgment action
when there is even a fifty percent chance the patent will be declared invalid.
The same can be said for any greater percentage. It is conceded that this
model has its limitations. However, it is illustrative of a greater point: that
MedImmune is a shift of power to the licensee and a roll back of the nearly
forty-year-old case law articulated in Lear v. Adkins.99
CONCLUSION
As illustrated by this model, the Supreme Court continued its assault on

99. 395 U.S. 653, 673 (1969). Notably, the Court did not expressly repudiate Lear. Id.
Instead, it merely differentiated the facts. Id. at 769. This leaves open the possibility of equitable
defenses and policy arguments. MedImmune v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007).
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the patentee in MedImmune. MedImmune is one of numerous recent cases
where the Supreme Court has assaulted the Federal Circuit and patentees.
MedImmune, however, represents a particularly salient departure from previous
Federal Circuit jurisprudence.
The elimination of the reasonable apprehension of suit test lowers the bar
for bringing a declaratory judgment action and allows a licensee to remain in
good standing while attacking the validity of a patent. This creates a gross
imbalance. The relative bargaining position of the parties changes immensely,
and it is now almost of no consequence for a licensee to Challenge the validity
of the patent. Practically, this adds to the costs of entering into any license
agreement, and thus creates a disincentive to do so. Since many patentees seek
patent protection for the sole purpose of being able to market their technology
through licensing, this has a trickledown effect of curbing innovation. Simply
put, the overhead cost associated with licensing a patent is now greater because
of the imbalance of power between patentees and licensees, which decreases the
value of a patent sought to be licensed. Unfortunately, MedImmune is just one
of many recent Supreme Court decisions that follow the disturbing trend of
weakening patents and repressing innovation.
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